The geography of violence in North and West Africa — a focus on borderlands

Violence against civilians has increased by 500% in West Africa since 2016

This is due in large part to the change in nature of conflicts as south of the Sahara, conflicts involve more and more actors such as secessionist rebels, religious extremists, self-defense groups and an increasing number of communal militias.

As the number of conflict actors has multiplied, violence has increased as have civilian casualties. With the increasing number of actors, responses have become more complex as conflicts have become more transnational, making greater regional cooperation necessary.

Number and types of events in West Africa, 1997-2021

One particularly disconcerting trend is borderland violence

In the first six months of 2021, 60% of victims of violent incidents were killed within 100 kilometres of a border.

This violence is unlikely to diminish in the short term. As more and more areas move into this category each year, especially in borderlands; conflicts are intensifying where they already exist and are spreading where they did not exist before.

Number of conflicts by type, 1997-2021

Are borderlands more violent than other areas?

By analysing data from 21 countries across 23 years, it becomes clear that nearly 9% of all violent events occurred within 10 kilometres of a border, where 6% of the total population lives.  At 20 kilometres from the border 15% of violent events occurred, and at 50 kilometres 25% of events occurred. This follows a classic distance decay-effect — the further from the border, the smaller the number of violent events observed. Therefore, we can say that borderlands are more violent than other areas.

Violent events, fatalities and population by border distance in North and West Africa, 1997-2021

Are some borderlands more violent than others?

By combining quantitative data on location of violent events with qualitative assessments in the form of case studies and an analysis of actor networks, it is possible to discern local, state and regional factors that have an impact on the level of violence in borderlands.

Violent actors exploit state weakness, notably in border areas. For example, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has successfully exploited local tensions around access to land, herding rights and mobility to secure favour in the tri-border area. Since the creation of ISGS in 2015, nearly half of all violent events in the region have occurred within 50 kilometres of the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger border.

Violent events involving select transnational organisations, 1999-2021

As violent non-state actors are proliferating in the region, they are also becoming increasingly transnational and are driving the increase in conflict.

Where borders are porous and state authority is weak, violent groups often take advantage of the situation to develop safe havens, recruit new members and acquire supplies. Boko Haram for example responds to pressure applied by one country by moving activities to neighbouring countries. In 2013,  when the Civilian Joint Task Force intervened to curtail Boko Haram’s activities in Maiduguri in Nigeria, this resulted in an escalation of attacks outside of the capital of this state and into parts of northern Cameroon.

Fatalities involving Boko Haram, ISWAP and government forces, 2009-20